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•  Parmalat of Italy, once one of the world’s leading dairy-food firms, filed for bankruptcy
protection in December 2003.  After the bankruptcy, it was discovered that fraud on a massive
scale had occurred at Parmalat, putting the firm in the infamous category occupied by Enron,
Tyco International, and WorldCom.
•  This Discussion Paper analyzes the origins, growth, strategies, downfall, and restructuring of
Parmalat, and identifies implications for the U.S. and world dairy industries and international
businesses that flow from the firm’s experiences.
The Origins, Growth, and Strategies of Parmalat
•  Currently headquartered in Collecchio, Italy, Parmalat grew from a small cold cuts and
preserves firm founded by Calisto Tanzi in 1962 into one of the world’s largest dairy-food
firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
•  The publicly-held Parmalat had about 36,000 employees and 135 plants in its worldwide
operations in mid-2003.  Parmalat’s sales totaled about 7.6 billion euros (U.S.$8.0 billion) in
2002.
•  Parmalat’s key strategies included the following practices during the 1980s, 1990s, and early
2000s:
—Employ debt as a major source of funding for acquisitions.
—Invest in countries with more growth potential than Western Europe.
—Emphasize sales of differentiated (value-added) dairy-food products.
—In developing countries, use commodity dairy products to generate cash and provide a
distribution channel.  As incomes increase in these countries, push higher-valued products
through the same channels.
The Downfall of Parmalat
•  Complicated developments preceded Parmalat’s implosion.  A shortage of short-term liquidity
precipitated the firm’s collapse.  It turned out that about four billion euros that were supposed
to exist in a Cayman Islands’ account controlled by Parmalat did not exist.  Without the cash,
Parmalat’s business empire crumbled.
•  Shoddy auditing practices failed to uncover Parmalat’s fraudulent behavior.
•  With hindsight, it is difficult to fathom why so many bankers and investors continued to lend to,
or invest in, Parmalat until shortly before its implosion.
•  While Parmalat’s shares had a market value of about 2.0 billion euros (U.S.$2.5 billion) before
the firm’s collapse, its actual assets totaled less than one billion euros (U.S.$1.23 billion) at the
end of 2003.
                                                
*W.D. Dobson is Professor Emeritus, Department of Agricultural and Applied Economics and
Agribusiness Economist for the Babcock Institute, UW-Madison.Parmalat
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Strategies and Practices that Exposed Parmalat to Major Risks
•  Parmalat’s rapid-fire acquisition strategy made it difficult to practice suitable due diligence.
•  Parmalat overestimated payoffs from consolidating fragmented fluid milk industries.
•  The size and complexity of Parmalat made it difficult to administer.
•  Parmalat engaged in brand proliferation.
How Parmalat Will Be Restructured
•  The restructuring plan calls for the sale of the dairy group’s non-core assets, slashing the
number of Parmalat’s brands, and concentration on milk, milk-related products and fruit juice.
•  Operations will be narrowed to about 10 countries, including Italy, Canada, Australia, South
Africa, Spain, Portugal, Russia, and Romania.
•  A new company will be set up that would convert debts owed creditors into equity shares (debt-
for-equity swap).  Creditors will lose more than 85% of the U.S.$17.3 billion they loaned to
Parmalat over the years.
•  Under an agreement entered into in the U.S., Parmalat agreed to have its board of directors
elected by shareholders and for a majority of the directors to be independent of company
management.
How Parmalat’s Experiences Will Shape Strategies in International Dairy Markets
•  Parmalat’s downfall confirms the notion that size and profitability don’t necessarily go
together.
•  The company’s experience indicates that fluid milk industries in many developed countries no
longer fit the classical description of fragmented industries.  Thus, consolidating fragmented
fluid milk industries in developed countries is not likely to represent the significant strategic
opportunity that it once did.
•  Parmalat’s attempts to operate diverse businesses (dairy-foods, tourism, and football)
successfully underscore the difficulty of doing so.
•  The firm’s success in becoming a world leader in sales of UHT milk should be recognized.
Parmalat did many things correctly to expand worldwide sales of this product.
Broader Lessons for International Businesses
•  Parmalat’s strategies represent a useful “don’t list.”
•  Shoddy auditing failed to identify Parmalat’s fraudulent behavior in a timely fashion.  Changes
in auditing practices are needed.
•  Special Administrator for Parmalat, Enrico Bondi, has filed suit against multinational auditing
firms and banks, alleging questionable practices on the part of these firms.  These suits are
likely to have a salutary effect on auditing and lending practices in international markets.Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2004-4 3
PARMALAT
W.D. Dobson
Parmalat of Italy, once one of the world’s
leading dairy-food firms, filed for bankruptcy
protection  in  December  2003.    After  the
bankruptcy, it was discovered that fraud on a
massive  scale  had  occurred  at  Parmalat,
putting  the  firm  in  the  infamous  category
occupied  by  Enron,  Tyco  International,  and
WorldCom.  The presence of fraud limits the
strategic  lessons  that  can  be  drawn  from
Parmalat’s experience.  However, Parmalat’s
experience  is  not  devoid  of  strategic
implications.  Indeed, Parmalat did a number
of  things  that,  on  the  surface,  at  least,
appeared orthodox and potentially  profitable
—e.g., became a world leader in  production
of UHT milk, engaged in  orthodox  product
differentiation, and consolidated parts of  the
fragmented international fluid milk business.
But Parmalat pursued practices that exposed
the firm to big risks and strong competition.
It is no stretch to conclude that these practices
contributed to Parmalat’s bankruptcy.
This  Discussion  Paper  analyzes  the
origins,  growth,  strategies,  downfall,  and
restructuring  of  Parmalat  and  identifies
implications  for  the  U.S.  and  world  dairy
industries  that  flow  from  the  firm’s
experiences.  Part of the analysis focuses on
how the restructuring of Parmalat will reshape
strategic  thinking  in  the  dairy  industry.
Finally,  a  few  broader  lessons  for
international businesses that are underscored
by Parmalat’s experiences are noted.
A  Caveat:    Certain  figures  reported  by
Parmalat in the firm’s H1 2003 Results and
Strategies report are employed in the  paper.
These  figures  should  be  interpreted  with
caution.    However,  the  figures  supplied  by
Parmalat  on  the  firm’s  plant  numbers  and
closely  related  information  for  various
countries  probably  are  accurate  since  other,
non-company, sources provide documentation
for  these  figures.    Data  on  the  identity  of
products sold and certain brand  information
supplied by Parmalat are also usable since the
identity  of  the  firm’s  products  could  be
transparently determined and there was  little
apparent incentive for Parmalat to falsify such
information.  Figures reported by Parmalat on
gross  sales  are  cited  in  the  paper.    It  is
questionable whether these  figures  are  fully
accurate  since  Parmalat  could  have  inflated
them to pump up profits and assets reported
by  the  firm.    However,  the  sales  figures
probably  are  useful  for  providing  general
approximations  of  the  firm’s  sales.    No
figures for the period prior to December 2003
taken  from  Parmalat’s  balance  sheet  and
profit and loss statement are included in the
study  since  these  are  the  subject  of  fraud
investigations.Parmalat
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Currently  headquartered  in  Collecchio,
Italy, Parmalat grew from a  small  cold  cuts
and preserves firm founded by Calisto Tanzi
in 1962 into one of the world’s largest dairy-
food firms in the late 1990s and early 2000s.
The  publicly-held  firm  had  about  36,000
employees  and  about  135  plants  in  its
worldwide  operations  in  mid-2003.
Parmalat’s  sales  totaled  about  7.6  billion
euros  (U.S.$8.0  billion)  in  2002  [28].
Products produced by the firm included items
from 25 product categories sold through the
firm’s  milk,  fresh  products,  vegetable,  and
bakery and other products divisions.
Parmalat became a world leader in UHT
milk  sales.    UHT  milk  was  Parmalat’s
strongest branded product and accounted for
about 90% of the firm’s milk sales in the late
1990s  and  early  2000s  [9].    This  product,
which has a shelf life of about six months in
an unopened container, represented the  bulk
of the firm’s sales in South America and half
the company’s sales in Europe.  Parmalat’s
sales of  UHT  milk  in  developing  countries
were  fostered  in  part  by  the  following
developments:
•  Governments in developing countries
promoted consumption of UHT milk as a
safe alternative to poor quality tap water.
•  Government programs to combat
malnutrition included UHT milk.
•  The longer shelf life and no refrigeration
costs led retailers to prefer to carry shelf-
stable UHT milk rather than regular
pasteurized milk.
Reflecting  an  aggressive  acquisition
strategy, Parmalat expanded its presence from
six  countries  to  31  countries  during  the
1990s.  According to Parmalat’s Results and
Strategies  Report,  the  company  recorded
about an 11-fold increase in sales from 1990
to  2002—mainly  through  acquisitions  [28].
Primarily  through  those  acquisitions,  the
company  established  a  major  presence  in
Brazil and also acquired plants in a host  of
countries  around  the  world.    Countries  in
which Parmalat operated plants in mid-2003
appear in Table 1.    Parmalat’s  employment
figures reveal the importance of the firm as an
employer in South America.  Over 40% of the
firm’s  employees  worked  at  Parmalat’s  32
South American plants (Table 1).
The firm’s Brazilian plants accounted for
a  substantial  share  of  the  South  American
employees. Prior to the implosion, Parmalat-
Brazil  employed  about  6,000  people  in  the
firm’s  nine  plants  [21].    The  nine  plants
purchased  milk  from  10,000  farmers,
recorded sales of U.S.$600 million per year,
and  were  second  only  to  Nestle-Brazil  in
sales.
I. The Origins, Growth, and Strategies of Parmalat
Table 1. Parmalat’s number of plants and employees by geographic area, June 30, 2003*





Europe:  France, Germany, Italy,
Portugal, United Kingdom, Romania,
Russia, Spain and Hungary
43 32.0 7,907 22.0
North and Central America:  Canada,
Cuba, Mexico, Nicaragua, Dominican
Republic, and U.S.
38 28.0 7,315 21.0
South America:  Argentina, Brazil,
Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay,
Uruguay and Venezuela
32 24.0 15,434 43.0
Rest of World:  Australia, Botswana,
China, Mozambique, South Africa,
Swaziland, Zambia, and Thailand
22 16.0 4,957 14.0
Total 135 100.0% 35,613 100.0%
*Source:  Parmalat’s H1 Results and Strategies Report [28].Parmalat
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Parmalat’s acquisitions were expected to
decline  in  the  early  2000s  while  the  firm
focused  on  integrating  new  businesses  into
the  company  and  paring  operating  costs.
There was a lull in acquisitions for the first
three quarters of 2000 but Parmalat closed the
year with five acquisitions in the final quarter
[40].  Parmalat’s  Chairman  renewed
speculation that the acquisitions were largely
over  with  the  following  comment  that
appeared in the firm’s H1 2003 Results and
Strategies Report [28]:
Parmalat  considers  that  the  phase  of
rapid expansion  is  substantially  completed.
The  focus  is  now  on  consolidation,
maximizing value of the expansion.
It is uncertain whether an era of consolidation
was  actually  underway  at  Parmalat  in  mid-
2003 since the firm imploded before it could
be  determined  whether  this  was  a  new
direction for the company.
The  percentage  of  Parmalat’s  sales  by
geographic area and product division for the
first half  of  2003  appear  in  Table  2.    The
figures in Table 2 are,  for the most part, not
surprising.  However, it is perhaps surprising
that a third of Parmalat’s sales were made in
North and Central America. While this figure
needs  to  be  interpreted  with  caution  for
reasons noted earlier, it undoubtedly reflects,
among  other  things,  the  importance  of
Parmalat as a player in Canada.
Parmalat’s key strategies for its dairy and
other food businesses included the following
practices during the 1980s, 1990s, and early
2000s [9]:
•  Employ debt as a major source of funding
for acquisitions.  Among other things, this
allowed the Tanzi family to retain 51% or
more of the control of the company.
•  Invest in countries with more growth
potential than Western Europe.
•  Transform the firm from a commodity
food company into a nutrition company,
offering functional foods that have
specific health benefits.
•  Expand the firm’s R&D capability to
support the increased sales of functional
foods and other differentiated products.
•  In developing countries, use commodity
dairy products to generate cash and
provide a distribution channel.  As
incomes increase in these countries, push
higher-valued products through the same
channels, build brand awareness for the
firm’s products, and ultimately introduce
a range of value-added products.
With  notable  exceptions,  Parmalat’s
strategies relating to dairy products and their
pattern  of  evolution  are  familiar.    For
example, Parmalat’s efforts  to  expand  sales
of  differentiated  products  and  develop  the
R&D  capacity  to  support  product
differentiation  are  familiar  strategies
employed  by  big  U.S.,  European,  and
Australasian firms.  The final strategy in the
list  is  broadly  similar  to  a  generic  (and
successful)  strategy  used  by  Nestle  for
expanding developing  country  food  product
sales in response to  changes  in  incomes  in
developing countries.
Table 2. Parmalat’s group sales by geographical area and product division, June 30, 2003*
Geographic Area % Product Division %
Europe 38.5 Milk 57.1
North and Central America 33.2 Fresh Products 23.0
South America 18.4 Vegetable 9.5
Rest of World 9.9 Bakery and Other 10.4
Total 100.0% 100.0%
*Source:  Parmalat’s H1 Results and Strategies Report [28]. Percentage figures represent percentages of total sales
of 3.426 billion Euros (U.S.$3.9 billion) for the half year ending June 30, 2003.  The Fresh Products Division
in Table 2 markets yogurt, desserts, cheeses, margarine, and butter.Parmalat
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As discussed later, the notable exceptions
relate to Parmalat’s use of debt and product
differentiation.  These  exceptions  might  be
regarded as orthodox practices.  Heavy use of
debt  as  a  major  source  of  funding  for
acquisitions is not an unusual strategy.  For
example,  the  successful  Kerry  Group  of
Ireland has made extensive use of debt for its
many  successful  acquisitions  during  recent
decades.  It also was not unusual for Parmalat
to  pursue  expanded  sales  of  differentiated
products—especially  branded  products.
However, the manner in which these strategies
were pursued by Parmalat produced risk and
generated problems for the firm.Parmalat
Babcock Institute Discussion Paper No. 2004-4 7
Parmalat’s Deceptions
As  was  the  case  at  Enron,  Tyco
International,  WorldCom  and  other  firms
involved  in  corporate  corruption  in  recent
years, the implosion of Parmalat turned out to
be a complicated matter.  The  full  range  of
developments  that  led  to  Parmalat’s
bankruptcy  has  yet  to  be  uncovered.    An
article  appearing  in  the  Economist  in  early
January 2004 described the complex financial
problems  that  were  unearthed  at  Parmalat
immediately before the firm’s bankruptcy in
December 2003, as follows[13]:
When  Enrico  Bondi,  a  turnaround
expert, arrived at Parmalat in mid-December,
2003, he thought his job was merely to  help
restructure  the  finances  of  Italy’s  biggest
dairy group.  Within  days,  however,  events
moved  faster  than  even  the  shrewd  Mr.
Bondi  can  have  predicted.    First,  Calisto
Tanzi,  Parmalat’s  founder  and  boss…was
ousted  in  a  brutal  show  of  strength  by  the
company’s  main  banks.  Then  Mr.  Bondi
began to uncover the truth behind Parmalat’s
strange balance sheet, and a bad  story  got
much worse.
The immediate problem at  the  company
had been  one  of  short-term  liquidity.   As  a
regular user of bond markets,  Parmalat  had
been  criticized  as  being  inefficient  for  its
habit  of  carrying  large  debts  that  were
supposedly  offset  by  big  cash  holdings.
Suddenly in December 2003,  it  struggled  to
redeem  a  150  million  eurobond  (U.S.$180
million),  despite  apparently  having  already
bought  back  much  of  the  issue.    Financial
markets wondered why the redemption was a
problem for the group with more than 4 billion
euros  of  reported  cash  and  short-term
assets.    Investors  then  panicked  when
Parmalat admitted that it had been unable to
release almost 500 million euros trapped in a
mutual fund in the Cayman Islands.
It turned out  that  the  four  billion  euros
that were supposed  to  exist  in  the  Cayman
Islands  account  were  fabricated  through  an
elaborate hoax.  At  the heart of  the  scandal
was a letter, supposedly written by a Bank of
America  official,  in  which  the  official
confirmed that Bonlat, a Parmalat subsidiary
based in the Cayman Islands, had deposits of
about  4.4  billion  euros  (U.S.$5.5  billion)
with the bank.   In  mid-December  2003  the
Bank of America said that the document had
been forged.  The cash simply did not exist.
Without the cash, Parmalat’s business empire
crumbled.
How  could  the  forged  letter  escape  the
notice of auditors since  standard  practice  is
for auditors to write independently to banks
for  confirmation  of  cash  balances?    Grant
Thornton, one of Parmalat’s  auditors,  relied
on Parmalat’s internal mail to deliver the letter
confirming  the  amount  of  money  in  the
Cayman Island  fund.    This  was  a  lapse  in
procedure that allowed Parmalat to perpetuate
the fraud.
The Economist reports that Parmalat used
additional  documents  to  support  the
fraudulent  claims  of  funds  in  the  Bonlat
account  in  the  Cayman  Islands,  as  follows
[13]:
…Investigation  magistrates  claim  that
four  times  a  year  Parmalat  was  using  a
crude,  but  effective,  system  for  forging
documents that purported to show  big  cash
balances within Bonlat.  The balance sheets
of the  subsidiaries  were  simply  adjusted  to
make sense of  the  group’s  overall  financial
position, and then reported to the center  as
audited numbers.
This was not the full extent of Parmalat’s
deceptions.    In  July  2004,  prosecutors  in
Milan,  Italy  were  seeking  to  indict  Calisto
Tanzi  and  other  Parmalat  officials  for
manipulating  the  Milan  stock  market.    In
brief,  it  was  charged  that  the  manipulation
occurred as follows [25]:
Shares  of  the  Italian  food  company
surged  17  percent  on  December  20,  1999,
after  Parmalat  issued  a  press  release
valuing  its  main  Brazilian  unit  at  about
U.S.$1.35 billion, or more than  two-thirds  of
Parmalat’s  total  market  worth  at  the  time.
What  investors  did  not  know  was  that  the
appraisal came from a report by  accountant
Deloitte  Touche  Tohmatsu  dated  July  23,
1998—17  months  earlier  and  six  months
before Brazil devalued the real, letting it drop
40 percent against the U.S. dollar.
II. The Downfall of ParmalatParmalat
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Why  was it so difficult  for  lenders  and
other  financial  institutions  to  discover  the
fraudulent behavior that was  taking  place  at
Parmalat?  Parmalat used elaborate bond and
derivatives  deals,  often  using  complex
offshore structures that involved some of its
many subsidiaries.  This made it difficult for
bankers and investors alike to understand the
firm’s complex balance sheet or to gauge the
true  extent  of  Parmalat’s  liabilities  [12].
However,  more  than  a  year  before  the
meltdown  at  Parmalat  one  financial  firm,
Merrill  Lynch,  did  report  that  it  could  not
understand  the  need  for  Parmalat’s  opaque
finances and advised investors to sell shares
in  the  firm.  Equipped  with  hindsight,  it  is
difficult to fathom why so many bankers and
investors continued  to  lend  to,  or  invest  in,
Parmalat  until  shortly  before  the  firm’s
meltdown.
Enrico Bondi was appointed by the Italian
government  to  the  position  of  special
administrator  to  run  and  restructure  the
insolvent Parmalat.  Bondi’s investigations—
not surprisingly—have shown that Parmalat’s
liabilities were much greater than  shown  on
the  company’s  balance  sheet  at  the  time  it
imploded.
Where Did All the Money Go?
Bondi’s  investigations  have  provided  a
partial  answer  to  the  question  that  bankers
and  investors  have  asked,  namely,  “Where
did all the money go?”
The  so-called  money  trail  identified  by
Bondi that appears in Table 3 contains items
that are not surprising and elements that only
a detailed investigation could reveal.  The big
item  (3.8  billion  euros)  for  acquisitions  is
perhaps not surprising given  the  acquisition
spree that Parmalat pursued in recent decades.
Large outlays for interest payments and fees
related to bank debts  and  interest  payments
for  fees  related  to  bonds  also  might  be
expected  given  the  heavy  use  that  Parmalat
made  of  debt.    Moreover,  borrowing  to
service debts  incurred  in  the  past  increased
these figures.
The amount of money siphoned off from
the  company  represents  a  relatively  large
figure. A Wall Street Journal report indicates
that  Enrico  Bondi  and  Italian  prosecutors
believe  that  nearly  500  million  euros  were
diverted to Parmatour, a travel company  run
by Calisto Tanzi’s daughter, Francesca [18].
Other smaller expenditures were channeled to
other companies  with  linkages  to  the  Tanzi
family.
Bondi’s  report  shows  that,  while
Parmalat’s shares had a market value of more
than  two  billion  euros  (U.S.$2.5  billion)
before  the  company’s  collapse,  its  actual
assets  totaled  less  than  one  billion  euros
(U.S.$1.23 billion) at the end of 2003 [18].






Interest Payments and Fees Related to Bank Debt 2.8 19.7
Interest Payments and Fees Related to Bonds 2.5 17.6
Siphoned Off from the Company 2.3 16.2




* Source: Galloni, A. and D. Reilly,       Wall Street Journal       [18].Parmalat
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There is no way to identify precisely the
strategies  and  practices  in  Parmalat’s  far-
flung  businesses  that  created  losses  at
operating units  and  produced  incentives  for
fraudulent behavior by the firm. However, as
noted below certain strategies pursued by the
firm carry inherent risk and created difficult
financial problems for the firm.
Parmalat’s Rapid-Fire Acquisition
Strategy
The  speed  with  which  Parmalat  made
acquisitions—e.g., recall that five  dairy firms
were  acquired  in  the  last  quarter  of  2000
alone--probably  precluded  the  firm  from
carrying out suitable due diligence. Business
analysts, Cullinan, Le Roux,  and  Weddigen,
indicate that successful acquirers address the
following  questions  as  part  of  the  due
diligence process [8]:
•  What is the firm really buying?
Successful acquirers test a deal’s strategic
logic.  They typically organize their
investigations around the four C’s of
competition: Customers, competitors,
costs, and capabilities.
•  What is the target’s stand-alone
value?  There are many accounting tricks
that a target firm can pull.  Often the only
way to uncover the tricks is to send a due
diligence team into the field to see what is
really happening with costs and sales.
Tricks and hidden treasures can be
uncovered by such investigations.
Successful acquirers frequently will walk
away from a target whose management is
uncooperative in due diligence.
•  What are the synergies and skeletons
associated with the target firm?
•  What is the walk away price?  The
walk away price should never include the
full value of the synergies.
While  Parmalat  may  have  conducted
detailed due diligence of the type required to
address these questions, it is doubtful that the
firm  did.    Such  a  due  diligence  procedure
would have been particularly time-consuming
and  difficult  in  the  many  foreign  markets
where Parmalat acquired dairy and other food
firms.  The rapid  acquisitions  burdened  the
firm with a heavy debt load and the associated




Parmalat  has  prided  itself  on  making
important  strides  toward  consolidating  the
fragmented international fluid  milk  business
but  the  firm  may  have  encountered  nasty
surprises in recent years. Why might negative
surprises have arisen for the company?
Parmalat  might  have  accepted  standard
arguments about benefits from consolidating
a fragmented industry of  the  type  advanced
by  Michael  Porter  of  Harvard’s  Business
School.  Porter defines a fragmented industry
as one where no firm has a significant market
share and no firm has the  market  power  to
shape  industry  events  [31].  He  adds  that
fragmented industries are commonly found in
agriculture in many countries.
Porter  elaborates,  noting  that  the
following  characteristics  tend  to  make  an
industry fragmented [31, p.196]:
•  Low entry barriers.
•  Absence of economies of scale or
experience curve.
•  High transportation costs.
•  High inventory costs or erratic sales
fluctuations.
•  No advantage of size in dealing with
buyers or suppliers.
•  Diseconomies of scale in some important
respect.
•  Diverse market needs.
•  Exit barriers.
Porter points out that an important payoff
from consolidating a fragmented industry  is
as follows [31, p.200]:
Overcoming  fragmentation  can  be  a
very  significant  strategic  opportunity.    The
payoff  to  consolidating  a  fragmented
III.Strategies and Practices that Exposed Parmalat to Major RisksParmalat
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industry can  be  high  because  the  costs  of
entry into it are by  definition  low,  and  there
tend  to  be  small  and  relatively  weak
competitors  who  offer  little  threat  of
retaliation.
The  points  and  quote  from  Porter
represent  generally  accepted  ideas  about
fragmented industries.    However,  several  of
the points and the quote fail to describe the
fluid milk businesses of many countries.
Competition for  the  fluid  milk  business
—particularly  the  most  desirable  business
—in  many  countries  is  rigorous.    Thus,
Parmalat  faced  competition  from  multi-
nationals  such  as  Nestle,  Unilever,  Kraft,
Fonterra, and other financially-strong firms in
both developing and industrialized countries.
Entry barriers may not be particularly low
in the international fluid milk business since
entry  frequently  must  be  secured  by
purchasing existing firms.    This  method  of
entry—which  was  pursued  with  vigor  by
Parmalat—reduces the need for a firm to cut
prices to gain market share  but  it  is  also  a
capital  intensive  way  to  acquire  business.
This contributed to placing a heavy financial
burden on Parmalat.
Economies  of  scale  and  transportation
costs will vary by country.  In countries such
as the U.S., Canada, Australia, and  Western
Europe,  economies  of  scale  in  fluid  milk
processing are substantial since it has become
feasible to ship fluid milk processed at large
plants  long  distances  efficiently  on  modern
highways.  In  developing  countries,  lack  of
scale economies and high transportation costs
may still contribute to industry fragmentation.
In  developed  countries,  there  are
significant advantages of size in dealing with
suppliers  and  buyers.    In  the  U.S.,  for
example, milk cooperatives and buyers  such
as  Wal-Mart  have  become  large  and
powerful.  Large processors are better able to
negotiate  successfully  with  such  suppliers
and customers.
Parmalat noted in the firm’s Results and
Strategies  Report  for  mid-2003  that  the
“U.S. is the largest milk market in the world
and still  fragmented  [28].”    This  comment
could  be  interpreted  to  mean  that  Parmalat
thought  that  the  U.S.  market  was  still  an
inviting  target  for  acquisitions  and
consolidation. If so, Parmalat appears to have
overstated the advantages of further reducing
fragmentation in the U.S.  market.    For  one
thing, many  of  the  most  attractive,  available
fluid  milk  businesses  already  have  been
acquired by Dean Foods.
Parmalat’s  experience  suggests  that
capitalizing on fragmentation—particularly if
it  involves  acquiring  fluid  milk  plants  with
borrowed  capital—can  be  risky.  Indeed,
reducing  fragmentation  in  fluid  milk
businesses may no longer represent “a  very
significant  strategic  opportunity”  in  many
countries.
The Size and Complexity of the Firm
Made it Difficult to Administer
A  business  with  about  135  plants  and
36,000 workers in 31 countries obviously is
complex  to  administer.    Moreover,  there  is
little  evidence  in  the  management  literature
that Parmalat developed business systems for
administering  its  far-flung  business  empire
that  were  as  sophisticated  and  effective  as
those  used  by  competitors  such  as  Nestle,
Unilever, and Fonterra.
Problems experienced  by  Parmalat  were
accentuated by the fact that a sizable number
of its plants were located in countries where
economic  instability  is  common.    For
example,  Brazil  and  Argentina  experienced
severe  economic  recessions  in  the  early
2000s, which reduced Parmalat’s earnings in
those countries.  Moreover, devaluation of the
currencies  of  the  two  countries  made  the
earnings  that  were  recorded  there  less
valuable when converted to euros.
Problems  with  exchange  rates  were  not
confined  to  Brazil  and  Argentina.  Parmalat
reported  the  changes  noted  in  Table  4  in
average exchange rates for the euro vs. other
major currencies of the  countries  where  the
firm did business.  It claimed that exchange
rate  factors  accounted  for  about  a  15%
decline in the value of the firm’s total sales
(expressed in euros) for the first half of 2003
compared  to  the  comparable  period  a  yearParmalat
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earlier [28].  The reported decline in the value
of the currencies relative to the euro appears
to  be  correct.    However,  because  of  the
fraudulent  reporting  of  the  firm’s  financial
results it is unclear whether the  15%  figure
can be relied upon.  However, exchange rate
developments  undoubtedly  depressed  the
firm’s sales reported in euros for 2003.
Table 4. Decline in average value of curren-
cies of selected countries relative to
the euro from first half of 2002 to
first half of 2003*
Currency Change  from  First
Half of 2002 to






*Source: Parmalat’s H1 2003 Results & Strategies [28].
Parmalat  was  also  involved  in  other
enterprises  unrelated  to  the  dairy-food
business,  including  tourism  (Parmatour),
professional  soccer  (Parma  Football  Club),
and Odeon TV.  There was some siphoning
off of funds and cross-subsidization of these
other  businesses  with  funds  earned  in  the
dairy-food business.
As  noted  earlier,  the  complexity  of
Parmalat’s  operations  carried  the  dubious
advantage of allowing the firm to fraudulently
conceal  weaknesses  in  the  firm’s  financial
statements.  However, this ability tempted the
firm  to  pursue  practices  that  led  to  its
implosion.
Proliferation of Brands
While proliferation of brands was not one
of  Parmalat’s  greatest  weaknesses,  brand
proliferation  probably  created  problems  for
the firm. Prior to the implosion, Parmalat had
some 120 brands for its milk, fresh products,
vegetables  and  bakery  products.    Familiar
international brands included Parmalat (UHT
milk), Santal (fruit juice products), Mr. Day
(muffins), and GriSbi (cookies).  In the U.S.
and  Canada,  the  firm’s  brands  included
Parmalat milk, Astro yogurt, Esker water, and
Archway cookies.
International  marketing  authority,
Nirmalya  Kumar,  contends  that  many
companies engage in brand proliferation and
accumulate  many  losing  or  marginally
profitable brands [20].  His research  shows
that businesses  earn  almost  all  their  profits
from a small number of brands—fewer than
the  80/20  rule  suggests.    He  supports  his
argument  with  the  following  findings
regarding  the  brand  portfolios  of  food
companies, Nestle and Unilever [20, p.2]:
Nestle  marketed  more  than  8,000
brands in 190 countries in 1996.  Around 55
of  them  were  global  brands,  140-odd  were
regional brands, and the remaining  7,800  or
so  were  local  brands.  The  bulk  of  the
company’s  profits  came  from  around  200
brands, or 2.5% of the portfolio…
Unilever had 1,600 brands in its portfolio
in  1999,  when  it  did  business  in  some  150
countries.  More than 90% of its profits came
from  400  brands.   Most  of  the  other  1,200
brands  made  losses  or,  at  best,  marginal
profits.
It is noteworthy that Unilever has recently
pared its brands to about 400 in an effort to
bolster the company’s profitability.
While  Parmalat  did  not  develop  the
massive  brand  portfolio  of  a  Nestle  or
Unilever, it did accumulate some 120 brands
for  a  much  smaller  product  line  than
possessed  by  these  huge  multinationals.
Some  of  Parmalat’s  brands—especially  the
UHT milk brands—provided useful  product
differentiation.    However,  Enrico  Bondi’s
restructuring plan for Parmalat suggests that
brand  proliferation  was  a  problem.    Bondi
plans  to  slash  the  number  of  the  group’s
brands from  120  to  30  and  concentrate  on
fruit  juice,  milk,  and  milk-related  products
[17].
What  is  one  to  make  of  the  risky
strategies undertaken  by  Parmalat?    Clearly
there  is  no  proof  that  any  one  of  these
strategies  pushed  Parmalat  into  bankruptcy.
However,  as  a  package,  the  strategies
probably  contributed  significantly  to  the
financial problems, and  ultimate  bankruptcy,
of Parmalat.Parmalat
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Main Elements of Restructuring Plan
Special  Administrator,  Enrico  Bondi,
unveiled a plan for restructuring Parmalat in
July 2004.  Bondi’s plan has the approval of
the  Italian  government.  Under  the  restruct-
uring plan,  Parmalat’s  creditors  will  submit
claims  for  reimbursement  (or  partial  reim-
bursement) from the insolvent firm.  Initially,
hearings will be held to determine the validity
of the claims. In certain cases where disagree-
ments arise about the eligibility  of  creditors
for reimbursement, the validity of the claims
will be settled by the courts.  
Main elements  of  the  restructuring  plan
are as follows:
•  The plan calls for the sale of the dairy
group’s non-core assets, slashing the
number of brands to the extent noted
earlier, and concentration on fruit juice,
milk, and milk-related products [17].
•  Early in the restructuring process
Parmalat indicated that it would narrow its
key operations to about 10 countries as it
tried to repair its balance sheet.  Countries
where Parmalat apparently would try to
maintain operations include Italy, Canada,
Australia, South Africa, Spain, Portugal,
Russia, and Romania [2].
•  A new company would be set up that
would convert debts owed to creditors
into equity shares (debt-for-equity swap).
Selected creditors would be paid in full,
including suppliers and investors who
loaned the company money after it went
into bankruptcy [24].
•  Creditors will lose more than 85% of the
U.S.$17.3 billion they loaned to Parmalat
over the years.  They will receive shares
and up to 500 warrants that may be
exchanged for future shares in the
restructured company that will have a
value equal to about 11% of their original
investment [11].
•  Under the reimbursement plan, Parmalat
creditors will hold a 47.9% stake in the
new company, which initially will be
controlled by a foundation.  By agreeing
to renounce their debt, subordinated
creditors—those who have little chance of
securing full reimbursement—will receive
shares in the new company in proportion
to their exposure to Parmalat [4].
•  The company that emerges from the
restructuring of the bankrupt food group
will distribute 50% of its profits in
dividends over a 15-year period [4].
•  Under an agreement entered into in the
U.S., Parmalat agreed to have its board of
directors elected by shareholders and for a
majority of directors to be independent of
company management.  The positions of
chairman and chief executive officer also
will be split as part of the agreement.
These concessions were agreed to in order
to avoid fines sought by the U.S. Securi-
ties and Exchange Commission.  The
agreement is subject to approval by the
federal court in Manhattan, New York [7].
Parmalat Canada Ltd.
A  development  that  will  help  with  the
Canadian  aspect  of  the  restructuring  is  the
financial  contribution  made  by  Ontario
Teachers  Pension  Plan  Board.    Ontario
Teachers have  injected CA$610 million  into
the  Canadian  arm  of  Parmalat  Finanziaria
SpA  to  refinance  100%  of  the  dairy
company’s  debts.    Toronto-based  Parmalat
Canada  Ltd—which  is  fully  owned  by  its
Italian parent but independently operated and
financed—said that the money will be used to
repay debts [2].
The actions by Ontario Teachers are not
surprising given the organization’s interest in
acquiring Parmalat Canada. Ontario Teachers
began talks to purchase the Canadian unit of
Parmalat in September 2003 but the talks fell
apart when  the  accounting  scandal  emerged
[2].
Mr. J. Leach, a Senior Vice  President of
Ontario  Teachers,  defended  the  financial
infusion,  saying  that  Parmalat  Canada  is  a
profitable  company  with  strong  prospects.
With respect to the CA$610 capital infusion,
Leach claimed that, “There is a ringed fence
around  it,  there  is  no  money  (from  this
IV. How Parmalat will be RestructuredParmalat
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refinancing)  leaked  out  to  Italy  (emphasis
supplied) [2].”  It may be that there is a fence
around the money, but in the messy business
of restructuring after a corporate bankruptcy,
few things are fully certain.
Parmalat Australia
Parmalat  Australia  represents  a  part  of
Parmalat that is likely to be a viable part of the
slimmed down, restructured organization.  A
June  2004  report  indicated  that  Parmalat’s
Australia Group generated positive cash flows
from  operating  activities  (after  interest  and
taxes)  of  AU$23  million  [29].    Parmalat
Australia’s Managing  Director,  David  Lord,
said  that  Parmalat  Australia  is  already
structured  to  drive  the  strategy  of  the
restructured group, since the  Australian  unit
focuses  on  milk,  milk-related  products,  and
fruit juices.  Moreover, the sale or shutdown
of  the  Thai,  Vietnamese,  and  Indonesian
components of Parmalat is likely to mean that
the  firm’s  Australian  component  will  be  a
platform  for  exports  of  dairy  products  to
customers in these three countries.
The Partial Dismemberment of
Parmalat
As noted earlier, Parmalat will  sell off  a
number of operations in hopes of becoming a
slimmer, profitable company.  A partial listing
of plant operations that have been sold, put up
for sale, or wound down by Parmalat appears
below.  (Companies put up for sale or wound
down  are  identified  in  the  list.  Other
companies listed have been sold.)
•  Milk Products of Alabama, U.S.A. (Part
of  Parmalat’s Farmland Dairies) [38].
•  Kinnet Dairy, U.S.A. (Parmalat’s
southern U.S. ice cream distributor) [2].
•  Parmalat, Thailand [16].
•  Parmalat, Vietnam [16].
•  Parmalat, Indonesia (Being wound down)
[16].
•  Parmalat UK [22].
•  Parmalat’s Inbal, Brazil Tomato
Processing Plant (Reversed the
acquisition of this small tomato
processing plant from Unilever) [30].
•  Parmalat (Tianjin) Dairy Co. Ltd and
Parmalat (Nanjing) Dairy Co. Ltd, China
(Operations suspended) [5].
•  Parmalat, Mexico [19].
•  Streglio, Parmalat’s chocolate maker (Put
up for sale) [17].
•  Parmatour (A portion of this tourism firm
has been put up for sale) [17].
This  list  of  firms,  compiled  in  August
2004,  is  certain  to  be  an  incomplete  list.
Enrico Bondi has indicated that the firm will
dispose  of  portions  of  its  South  American,
U.S. and Asian holdings in order to develop a
smaller,  more  profitable  company.
Parmalat’s Brazilian operations, in particular,
represent a potentially  large  group  of  firms
that likely will be placed on the market. Thus,
the financial news can be expected  to  show
many  additional  sales  announcements  as
suitable buyers are found.Parmalat
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It  is  too  early  to  fully  assess  how
Parmalat’s experiences  will  shape  strategies
in international dairy markets.  However, the
firm’s experiences provide a few insights on
strategies that are likely to be successful and
strategies that may no longer work effectively.
Competitors  probably  envied  Parmalat’s
meteoric growth during the 1990s and early
2000s.  The fact that Parmalat’s growth was
obtained fraudulently will cause businesses to
remember the old addage that, “If it looks too
good to be true, it probably is.”   Parmalat’s
performance  probably  should  have  been
recognized  earlier  as  being  too  good  to  be
true given  the  risky  strategies  that  the  firm
pursued.
Parmalat’s downfall confirms the  notion
that size and profitability don’t necessarily go
together.  Parmalat  was  undoubtedly  a
complex firm to manage, especially given the
large number of countries in which the firm
operated.  Moreover, there is little evidence in
the management literature that Parmalat had a
suitable  system  for  managing  its  sprawling
operations.  Multinationals such as Parmalat
probably  need  sophisticated  management
systems of the type developed by Nestle and
Unilever  over  the  decades  to  operate
successfully  in  risky  international  dairy
markets.
The difficulties that Parmalat experienced
in  consolidating  fragmented  fluid  milk
businesses  throughout  the  world  should  be
carefully  noted.    Fluid  milk  industries  in
many developed  countries  no  longer  fit  the
classical description of fragmented industries,
and  consolidating  these  industries  is  not
likely  to  represent  a  significant  strategic
opportunity.  In the U.S., for example, many
of  the  desirable  acquisitions  have  already
been  made  by  Dean  Foods.  Secondly,
conditions  have  developed  favoring
economies  of  scale  in  processing  and
distribution in fluid milk businesses.  Finally,
market  share  and  the  ability  to  shape
developments  in  the  industry  have  become
valued  attributes  possessed  by  many
processors.  The lack of fragmentation in its
classic  form  in  many  developed  countries
means that acquisitions must be made using
formulas suitable for industries where market
power prevails.
Fragmentation undoubtedly still exists in
fluid  milk  industries  in  many  developing
countries.    Firms  seeking  to  gain  from
elimination  of  fragmentation  may  still  find
profitable  opportunities  in  these  countries.
However, a premium will be placed on doing
careful due diligence  before  acquiring  dairy
plants in these countries.  For reasons noted
earlier,  conducting  suitable  due  diligence  is
not an easy task in such countries.
Parmalat’s  attempt  to  operate  diverse
businesses  (dairy-foods,  tourism,  football)
successfully  underscores  the  difficulty  of
doing so.  In particular, the skills needed to
run  a  dairy-food  business  successfully  are
not the same as those needed to run a tourism
business profitably.  This, of course, is not a
revelation.   Many  firms  learned  this  lesson
the hard way in the 1960s and 1970s. But in
Parmalat’s  case  it  led  to  siphoning  off  of
funds  from  the  dairy-food  business,  cross
subsidization, and fraud.
Parmalat’s success in becoming a world
leader  in  sales  of  UHT  milk  should  be
recognized.  The company did  many  things
correctly in expanding worldwide sales of this
product.  While Parmalat  probably  engaged
in excessive proliferation of brands, its efforts
to develop  differentiated  products  appear  to
be  much  like  those  of  other  leading
international dairy firms.  The firm’s efforts
toward product differentiation—in a business
where  commodities  are  common—appeared
satisfactory.
V. How Parmalat’s Experiences Will Shape Strategies in International Dairy
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A  key  lesson  from  Parmalat’s
experiences, one supposes, is that owners and
managers should avoid putting themselves in
positions that create incentives for fraudulent
behavior.    Thus,  certain  business  practices
and strategies pursued by Parmalat represent
a useful “don’t list.”  Legal actions taken by
Enrico Bondi also identify broader lessons.
Mr. Eugene Flegm, the former auditor of
General  Motors  Corporation,  said  that  a
number  of  factors,  including  those  noted
below,  created  conditions  for  a  “perfect
storm” in which the scandals of the past three
years—one  of  which  involved  Parmalat—
were nearly inevitable [1]:
A  lack  of  business  ethics,  a
congressional  misunderstanding  of  the  role
of the Securities and Exchange Commission
(in the U.S.), pressure from company boards
of  directors  and  poor  internal  controls  all
contributed to a bad environment.
While  some  of  these  factors  were
involved  in  Parmalat’s  bankruptcy  and
associated fraud, a more  important  factor  is
probably the poor quality of auditing for the
firm.  Auditing  is  frequently  regarded  as
“grunt  work”  that  is  assigned  to  junior
members of an auditing firm.  Whether this
was the case at Parmalat is unclear.  However,
the  quality  of  the  audits  appears
unquestionably  poor.    Indeed,  Mr.  Enrico
Bondi  has  brought  suit  against  one  the
auditing  firms  that  allegedly  allowed
fraudulent behavior to continue at Parmalat.
Bondi’s  lawsuits  seek  damages  from
firms that allegedly  engaged  in  unlawful  or
negligent behavior for  auditing  or  financing
of  Parmalat  (Table  5).    Bondi’s  charges
against  Parmalat’s  auditors  are  noteworthy
[35].
Parmalat argues that firms in the  global
networks  of  Deloitte  Touche  Tohmatsu,
whose Italian affiliate was Parmalat’s primary
auditor  from  1999  until  its  collapse  in
December  2003,  and  Grant  Thornton
International,  whose  Italian  arm  audited
select Parmalat businesses during the same
period failed to perform proper audits, and in
some cases actively took part in ‘looting’  of
the company.  The suit also claims that that
Deloitte  ‘ignored  repeated  clear  warnings
from member firms around the world of wholly
unsubstantiated  transactions  [at  Parmalat]
that bore the hallmarks of fraud.’
Deloitte  Touche  Tomatsu  said  that
Parmalat’s action is unjustified and  that  the
firm will defend itself against the charge.  The
auditor said it is being sued on the theory that
it  failed  to  catch  Parmalat  for  its  own
fraudulent actions.  Parmalat could  possibly
claim that it was given defective service.  But
that  may  be  a  hard  sell  since  Parmalat’s
former  managers  are  alleged  to  have
masterminded the fraud [35].
An important side issue is involved in this
case.  Parmalat’s  suit  alleges  that
responsibility  for  audit-related  problems  at
the  company  should  rest  with  the  global
accounting  organization,  not  just  the  Italian
affiliates.  The Wall Street Journal describes
why international auditing firms currently are
organized to prevent the sort of responsibility
that Parmalat desires, as follows [35]:
VI. Broader Lessons for International Businesses
Table 5. Lawsuits filed against firms that had dealings with Parmalat*
Target Country Where Suit
was Filed
Amount Sought
Bank of America US US$10 Billion
Citigroup US US$10 Billion
UBS Italy 290 Million Euros
Deutsche Bank Italy 17 Million Euros
Credit Suisse First Boston Italy 248 Million Euros
Various Arms of Deloitte Touche Tohmatsu
and Grant Thornton Int’l.
US US$10 Billion
* Source:       Wall Street Journal       [32,33,34,35].Parmalat
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Accounting  firms  such  as  Deloitte  and
Grant  Thornton  are  typically  structured  so
that  each  country  operation  within  their
global  network  is  an  individual  business,
usually  a  limited-liability  partnership,  that
doesn’t  share  legal  ties  with  other
businesses  within  the  group.    Such
structures  are  designed  in  part  to  prevent
auditors,  usually  seen  as  deep-pocket
defendants  in  corporate  collapses,  from
collectively  sharing  the  financial  burden  of
lawsuits related to audit work done by  other
firms within the group.
If Bondi (Parmalat) should be victorious
in  this  suit,  it  presumably  would  have
important  implications  for  multinational
accounting  firms.  The  deep  pockets  of  the
parent  accounting  and  auditing  firms  could
become more readily accessible  to  plaintiffs
in corporate bankruptcy cases.
The  lawsuits  brought  by  Bondi  against
banks are complex and beyond the scope of
this paper.  Thus, only brief summary points
regarding the charges made against the banks
appear below [32,33,34, 35]:
•  Bank of America: Bondi’s suit, filed in a
North Carolina court, seeks up to $10
billion from Bank of America.  The suit
charges that Bank of America continually
induced Parmalat to incur more debt in
order to fuel Bank of America’s demand
for fees and additional interest payments,
and to hide Parmalat’s true financial
condition.
•  Citigroup: Bondi’s suit, filed in a New
Jersey state court, seeks $10 billion from
from Citigroup.  He claims a series of
transactions the bank arranged for
Parmalat were designed to help its
managers disguise the firm’s perilous
financial condition.
•  UBS:  Bondi is seeking to recoup 290
million euros he claims UBS received
when Parmalat in December 2003
defaulted on its debt.  Bondi alleges that
the bank’s actions essentially put it ahead
of other creditors by improperly ensuring
that it would get money back from the
transaction if Parmalat defaulted.
•  Credit Suisse First Boston: The suit
alleges that CSFB, a unit of Switzerland’s
Credit Suisse Group, in 2002 arranged a
complex transaction for a Parmalat
subsidiary in Brazil that effectively
allowed the parent firm to disguise the
true level of its debts.
•  Deutsche Bank: Bondi is expected to
claim that by arranging debt issues during
the second half of 2003, Deutsche Bank
helped worsen the condition that led to
Parmalat’s insolvency.
Bank  of  America,  Citigroup,  UBS,
Deutsche  Bank  and  Credit  Suisse  First
Boston  will  vigorously  defend  themselves
against  the  claims  raised  by  Bondi  for
Parmalat.  It is not useful to speculate about
the outcome of these lawsuits.  However, even
if not fully successful, the suits might have  a
beneficial effect on lending practices of banks
to multinationals.  The lawsuits should make
the  banks  more  cautious  about  lending  to
firms with opaque financial statements.Parmalat
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